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Geographic Access and Demand in the Market for Alcohol 
 
Mark L. Burkey1 
 
ABSTRACT: Policy in many regions restricts geographic access to alcohol by reducing the 
number of outlets where alcohol is available for purchase.  In previous studies imprecise 
measures of access and the lack of a theoretical framework has caused improper economic 
interpretations of how reducing access should affect consumer behavior.  This paper makes 
several improvements in the study of geographic access to alcohol, employing new 
economic theory, new techniques for measuring access, and spatial econometric techniques.  
We find that although reducing access does reduce apparent per capita consumption of 
liquor, economic theory suggests that many alcohol-related problems are unlikely to be 
affected. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although theoretical analyses of the interaction between consumer location and 
firm location have been common since the time of Sraffa (1926) and Hotelling (1929), 
little empirical research has been done to estimate the impact that transportation costs 
(i.e. geographic access) have on consumer demand.  Additionally, almost all theoretical 
models assume that consumers face a transportation cost for each unit purchased.  In 
many cases this simplifies the analysis because it is equivalent to analyzing a change in 
the price of a good.  However, in most consumer markets these models are unrealistic.   
In this paper we make several contributions to the spatial economic analysis of 
consumer demand.  We analyze the market for retail sales of liquor (distilled spirits) in 
two contiguous “control”2 states.  First, making the assumption that consumers are likely 
to purchase from the closest liquor store to their residence, we create “market areas” for 
each of the 650 liquor stores in two U.S. States (North Carolina and Virginia).  These 
market areas allow us to use U.S. Census data to find demographic characteristics of 
these consumers, and estimate the distance that consumers must travel to the nearest 
liquor outlet. 
Second, we estimate demand functions using spatial regression techniques.  
These models allow for correction of spatial spillovers, as is the case when consumers 
purchase from a neighboring market area.  Lastly, we do not interpret increasing travel 
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cost as equivalent to an increase in price.  Realizing that increasing travel costs do not 
affect the marginal costs, but are a fixed cost of access, we interpret the results in the 
context of a two-part tariff model. 
After reviewing the relevant literature in the next section, we describe the 
theoretical model in Section 3.  In Section 4 we describe the data, and discuss the 
estimation and results in Section 5. The implications of the results on alcohol control 
policy are given in Section 6. 
2. BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
2.1 Theoretical Models 
Fetter (1924) was one of the earliest economists to model the impact of 
transportation costs on consumer behavior.  Assuming that each unit purchased must be 
shipped at a freight rate that depends on distance, he describes how a firm’s market area 
is determined based on the prices of its competitors and the freight rate.  Hotelling’s 
famous Stability in Competition (1929) and refinements by d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, 
and Thisse (1979) furthered this research to consider the choice of firm location using 
Game Theory. 
These models have been extended in many ways. For example, Prescott and 
Visscher (1977) and Salop (1979) use similar models to describe the extent of product 
differentiation and Spulber (1981) derives optimal nonlinear pricing functions for a 
spatial monopolist. However, all of these models either explicitly or implicitly assume 
that every unit purchased is subject to a separate transportation charge. 
These per-unit transportation cost models make sense in some contexts, but do 
not properly model the choices faced by consumers in many others.  Most consumer 
transactions involve a transportation cost which is relatively independent of the quantity 
of purchases made.  In other words, consumers may incur costs of time, gas, and vehicle 
wear and tear, yet incur no marginal transportation cost for each item purchased.  The 
cost of transportation is a hurdle that must be overcome that is then sunk, and thus 
irrelevant for the decision about quantity purchased.   
There are very few discussions of lump-sum transportation costs in economic 
literature.  Stahl (1982) uses a lump-sum transportation cost to explore the location of 
monopolistically competitive duopolists on a line, finding that lump-sum costs can 
provide some explanation for the agglomeration of firms.  Burkey and Kurepa (2004) 
have solved pricing models with lump-sum transportation costs, comparing the results to 
those derived in per-unit models. 
In a goods market such as that for liquor, two separate fees must be paid.  First, a 
fixed fee of access that increases with distance must be overcome.  Second, a per-unit 
price must be paid.  A lump-sum travel cost is analogous to the fixed fee in a two-part 
tariff framework as discussed by Oi (1971) and Schmalensee (1981).  In order to 
purchase a good, a consumer must pay a lump-sum fee.  If the consumer pays the fee, 
then he can purchase any number of goods for a constant (marginal) price.  We will 
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return to these two-part tariff models in Section 3 and use them in the discussion of the 
empirical results in Section 5. 
2.2 Empirical Models  
In the arena of non-market goods, Hotelling (1947) is also credited with 
suggesting a method of estimating the value of national parks by the Travel Cost Method 
(TCM).  The TCM is a method of estimating the willingness to pay for a non-market 
good by using the opportunity cost of time spent at a park as an estimate of the marginal 
cost the consumer pays, and the travel costs incurred (fixed fee) is used as a lower bound 
on the consumers’ surplus for each visit.  Collecting this data through surveys allows 
estimation of the market demand curve for a site.  However, it is not the goal of the TCM 
to estimate how the transportation cost affects demand.  The value of the transportation 
cost to the consumer is not estimated, but is normally assumed to be some fixed 
proportion of wages.3 
Empirical models of transportation costs in product markets are rare.  Davis 
(2006) includes customer locations in a model of spatial competition among movie 
theaters.  Several studies measure the effects of geographic access to various medical 
services, including abortion (Kane and Staiger, 1996) and physician services (Newhouse 
et al., 1982).  However, a very active research area focuses on the market for alcoholic 
beverages. 
Beard et al. (1997) explicitly model a consumer’s decision to drive across state 
lines in order to take advantage of price differences.  They correctly realize the difference 
between a fixed transportation cost and the price paid. Using a model incorporating state 
prices, incomes, race, tourism, and sales, they estimate the amount of border-crossing 
behavior in northeastern alcohol markets.  They find substantial amounts of border-
crossing in the New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, and District of Columbia markets. 
However, most research regarding geographic access to alcohol mistakenly 
equates the effects of restricting access to a price increase.  While the effect of price 
increases on various types of drinkers is well understood (Manning et al., 1995, Cook and 
Tauchen, 1982), the effects of access are not.  Most research on access finds that while 
apparent per capita consumption decreases when access costs increase, they often find 
that alcohol-related problems do not decrease; the authors are often puzzled at this result. 
The findings appear to depend greatly on how access is defined, and whether the 
outcome measure correlates more to acute or chronic alcohol consumption.  For example, 
one is certain to find that a neighborhood with many bars (high “access”) will have high 
rates of drunk and disorderly conduct.  However, one must use care to avoid confusing 
the factors that determine the location of drinking with those that may affect the 
frequency of consumption or volume consumed per occasion. 
For example, Scribner et al. (1998) found a positive relationship between alcohol 
availability and gonorrhea rates.  Gyimah-Brempong (2001) finds statistically significant 
relationships between access and a variety of crime measures.  However, Markowitz 
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(2000) and Gorman et al.(1998) both fail to find any relationship between measures of 
access and spousal abuse. 
Gruenewald et al. (1996) find that although availability does not have a 
relationship with self-reported driving under the influence, there is a relationship with 
Single Vehicle, Nighttime (SVN) crashes4.  However, focusing on vehicle fatalities of 
young men, Kelleher et al. (1996) found that availability played no role.   Brown and 
Jewell (1996) find a small, statistically significant relationship between availability and 
cirrhosis mortality, but Xie, Mann and Smart (2000) find no relationship.  Tatlow, Clapp, 
and Hohman (2000) find that increased access has a positive relationship with alcohol-
related hospital admissions.  Lester (1995) found that measures of access to alcohol were 
not related to suicide nor homicide rates.  However, Scribner et al. (1999) found that 
access was statistically significantly related to homicide rates in New Orleans.  We will 
attempt to reconcile some of these apparent contradictions in the next section. 
3.  A THEORY OF DEMAND WITH ACCESS COSTS 
In order to purchase a good, a consumer must incur a lump-sum travel cost (T).  
If the consumer pays the fee, then he can purchase any quantity for a constant price per 
unit (p).  T will be a function of distance to a store, commuting patterns near stores, the 
number of stores, and the distribution of stores.  The main difference between a two-part 
tariff model and the current framework is that the fixed fee is not collected by the firm, 
but has a similar effect of causing consumers to “disconnect” from the market when the 
fixed fee is sufficiently large.5   We also include a taste parameter for alcohol that can be 
partially explained by demographic characteristics, a.      
Let us construct a demand function for good q.  Since the expenditure share for 
any one good is typically small, any income effects will be small.6  Therefore, we will 
not dwell on the income effects in this analysis.   
A consumer will choose to purchase the good if the consumer’s surplus from the 
transaction is greater than the travel cost (given income y): 
(1)   
( , , )
P
CS q a y T p dp T= −∫∞ >
                                                
For a given T = തܶ, one could in principle find the minimum level of the taste parameter 
(am) and income (ym) at which a consumer is indifferent between purchasing and 
disconnecting from the market and purchasing a substitute. The transportation cost only 
affects the choice of whether to purchase the good, while the price affects both how much 
is purchased and whether it is purchased.  In both states considered in the empirical 
analysis, substitutes for retail liquor are readily available.  For example, in North Carolina 
25,943 businesses hold licenses to sell beer, wine, and/or mixed beverages. Only 77 of 
 
4 “SVN” crashes are often used as a proxy for alcohol-related crashes. 
5 That is, larger than consumer’s surplus. 
6 See Vives(1987). 
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739 zip codes have contain no substitutes for retail liquor, with 2.57% of the population 
living in these zip codes.  
The preceding exposition uses several basic economic results to derive important 
new implications for the study of alcohol demand.  For any given access cost, only those 
with sufficiently strong demand will choose to purchase the good.  As policies to reduce 
geographic access are strengthened, those with lower taste parameters will drop out of the 
market first.  In the absence of income effects, because the price of the good has not 
changed, consumption for those with sufficiently high demand will be unaffected, but per 
capita consumption will go down as those with lower demand drop out of the market (and 
possibly purchase a substitute product). 
When access costs increase, those consumers who continue to purchase the good 
may purchase or consume more on each trip in order to economize on the travel costs 
themselves.  One can see this effect most easily in a dynamic framework within the well-
known Economic Order Quantity model.7  In this model yearly demand (D) is normally 
assumed fixed, C is a per-item inventory cost, and T is a fixed ordering cost per 
transaction that is analogous to a travel cost.  In equation (2) below we see that the 
optimal Quantity purchased per transaction is increasing in T, and in equation (3) we see 
that the optimal Number of transactions (trips) per year is decreasing in T. 
(2) 
2* TDQ
C
=  
(3) N*= 2
DC
T  
However, neither the static nor dynamic theories suggest that the highest demanders will 
moderate consumption as T increases. 
These realizations help to explain the apparent inconsistency in the alcohol 
literature regarding the effect of access on outcomes associated with heavy, chronic 
drinking. Many of the studies finding relationships between access and crime measures 
may be finding that high concentrations of on-premise outlets are loci of criminal and 
drunken behavior, rather than the concentration of off-premise outlets causing increases 
in the rates of these behaviors. While apparent per capita consumption may decrease, this 
decrease is likely to reflect the truncation of the lower tail of the distribution rather than a 
change in the behavior of heavy consumers, who should be the target of policy reforms. 
4. EMPIRICAL CONTEXT AND DATA 
4.1 Context 
With the above theory in mind, we now describe a data set that will be used to 
empirically describe some of the implications of the model.  Sadly, a direct test of the 
model is not possible with any available data.  In order to directly verify the predictions 
that those with lower demand for alcohol drop out of the market while those with higher 
demand are unaffected would require a micro data set on alcohol consumption that 
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contains a meaningful measure of geographic access.  At this point, no such data set 
exists.  
Because the basic elements of the theory are well-understood, we will instead use 
the available data to perform two tasks.  First, we will estimate parameters for a demand 
function that can be interpreted using the theory presented in Section 3.  Second, we will 
interpret these estimates in a detailed manner with the aid of additional theoretical results.  
We construct our data set using retail liquor outlets in North Carolina and 
Virginia during 2003.  We use these contiguous states because in these control states, 
only liquor is sold in these outlets.8  This creates a situation where a special stop (if not a 
special trip) must be made in order to purchase liquor in these states.  Additionally, 
advertising, pricing, and selection are all regulated and fairly homogenous both within 
and between these states.  Table 1 provides important statistics on state characteristics for 
comparison.  Table 2 provides a comparison of the pricing formulas in each state. 
We see that these two states are almost identical in most respects, except that 
while North Carolina has a larger area, it appears to have much higher access to alcohol.  
Two common measures of access are shown, Stores/Capita and Stores/Square Mile.  
Using these simple methods, one may wonder why the per capita sales are almost 
identical.  How access is measured should be carefully considered.  
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics for Virginia and North Carolina, 2003 
  Virginia  North Carolina  
Population 7,078,515 8,049,313 
Area (Square Mi.) 40,815 52,712 
Annual Sales Retail $353,289,410  $396,306,047  
Number of Stores 269 381 
Retail Sales per Store $1,313,344  $1,040,173  
Stores/100,000 Population 3.80 4.73 
Stores/1000 Square Miles 6.59 7.23 
Sales Per Capita $49.91  $49.23  
 
TABLE 2. Breakdown of $3 (distiller’s price) bottles of liquor in each state 
 Virginia North Carolina 
Distiller’s price $3.00 $3.00 
Federal tax 2.24 2.24 
Markup 2.50 2.38 
State excise tax 1.60 2.02 
Warehouse charge .11 .14 
Total: $9.45 $9.75 
                                                 
8 A small amount of wine is sold at liquor stores in each state.  In North Carolina, it is only for special orders 
for products not imported into the state by a wholesaler.  In Virginia, products produced by Virginia vintners 
are sold in ABC stores.  Additionally, a small variety of “mixers” are sold at stores in both states.  However, 
both wine and mixer sales account for much less than 1% of total revenue. 
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4.2 Measuring Access 
Consider two square counties which have five liquor stores each.  County A has 
one store located in each corner, and one in the center of the county.  County B’s five 
stores are located on top of one another in the center of the county.  Previous measures of 
access would treat these two counties in the same way.  However, because access should 
be a proxy for a transaction cost associated with purchasing alcohol, this is unacceptable. 
We use the individual outlet as the level of observation for this study.  The 
locations and sales are determined and the characteristics of those living nearest the 
stores is determined from census data at the block group level (groups of approximately 
1,500 residents).  Characteristics including incomes, racial characteristics, tourism, and 
unemployment rates are used as control variables. 
In order to match consumers to stores, we create market areas with Thiessen 
Polygons (Figure 1) around each outlet.  These polygons simply define all areas that are 
closer to a particular store than any other store, where the liquor outlet is represented by a 
point roughly in the center.  All census block groups whose center (centroid) is located in 
a given outlet’s polygon will be matched to that store for analysis. 
FIGURE 1: Thiessen Polygons for Liquor Stores 
 
 
This method makes the rather strong assumption that consumers patronize the 
store closest to where they live. We will attempt to correct for violations in this 
assumption with the econometric techniques employed.  The measure of access we use 
here is defined as the weighted average of consumer distance to the closest store.  This 
distance is computed as follows:  
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(4)   
n n
n
n
n
P D
T
P
=
∑
∑
 
where P is the number of consumers in block group n, and D is the distance from the 
center of the block group to the closest store.  The summation is over the number of block 
groups closest to a particular store.  There are 10,001 block groups and 650 stores in this 
study, for an average of 15.4 block groups associated with each store.  The natural log of 
the distance is used, so that the parameter estimate will represent an elasticity. 
4.3 Other Data 
Data on sales and location for each store in North Carolina are based on an 
original data set collected for this study in cooperation with the North Carolina ABC 
Commission for the year 2003.  The data on sales and location for each store in Virginia 
came from the Virginia ABC Commission.  Data on religious affiliation was taken from 
Religious Congregations and Membership in the United States 20009.  The source for all 
other socioeconomic data is the 2000 census.  All of the socioeconomic variables were 
measured by block group, and weighted averages over the consumers of a given store 
were computed for use in the regressions.     
Sales is the dollar amount10 sold per store retail, not including the sales these 
stores make to restaurants or bars.  This figure is divided by the number of potential 
consumers patronizing a store, and the natural logarithm of this per capita figure is used 
in regressions.  The number of potential consumers was defined as follows:  First, the 
number of people 18 and over was computed.  Of course, the legal drinking age is 21 in 
the U.S.; however, failing to include those 18 to 20 as demanders would ignore the 
importance of this segment of the market.  In all, approximately 10 million Americans 
under the age of 21 reported having had at least one drink in the previous month (NIDA, 
1995).  Although many people under the age of 18 also drink alcohol, 18 appeared to be 
an empirically valid cutoff point. The percentages of 16-17 year olds who use alcohol or 
binge drink are roughly half that of the 18-20 year old and 21 and over rates (NIDA 
1995). 
From this number of potential consumers, institutionalized persons and military 
personnel were removed.  Institutionalized persons will undoubtedly face large obstacles 
when attempting to obtain liquor, thus removing nursing home and prison populations is 
in order.  Any consumption by these persons will increase the apparent consumption of 
those living near such an institution, but such effects will surely be very small.   
Religion measured in two ways.  First, the percentage of residents of a county 
who are affiliated with a church which is associated with the Southern Baptist 
                                                 
9 Jones et al. (2002) 
10 Ideally one would use the quantity of alcohol sold, however, this data is not recorded for most individual 
stores in North Carolina.  Sales will tend to overestimate quantity in affluent areas, because through product 
selection the average price per unit is higher in these areas.  The income variable will control for this 
“quality-selection effect”. 
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Convention is used.  This choice was made for two reasons.  The Southern Baptists 
represent a large portion (31%) of the religious population in Virginia and North 
Carolina, and as much as 60% of the general population in some areas.  For this reason, 
the percentage of residents in this category is highly correlated with the overall religiosity 
of residents in an area.  Southern Baptists were also chosen because of their historical, 
decidedly anti-liquor position (Rosenberg, 1989).  Since this data was available only at 
the county level, the percentage of residents who are “adherents” 11  of a Southern Baptist 
church in the county in which a liquor store is located is used.  Additionally, the 
percentage of residents who are adherents of any other religion (not including Southern 
Baptists) were also used as a control.  
Race is controlled for using the percentage of inhabitants of a market area that 
are other than white, non-Hispanic.  Typically, nonwhites drink less than whites do.  
Whites have a usage rate of 56%, compared with 45% and 41% for Hispanics and Blacks 
(NIDA, 1995).  Thus, the expected sign of the coefficient on this variable is negative. 
The natural log of the weighted average per capita income is used, calculated in a 
fashion similar to Equation (2).  This elasticity is expected to be positive, since an 
increase in income is likely to increase both the quality and quantity of liquor purchased.  
Because prices are fixed at every store, but higher income patrons may select more 
expensive brands, the  income variable will control for variation in both demand and 
quality selection effects.  
A dummy variable intended to capture any effects that Virginia’s liquor stores 
may have on sales is used.  This may capture such factors as the 3% price difference 
between North Carolina and Virginia, minor differences in selection, or other factors.12    
Two variables were included to control for substitutes.  As a possible substitute 
for retail liquor to drink at home, the availability of Mixed Beverage outlets was 
included, measured as the number of outlets per 10,000 people in the market area.  This 
data was generated using GIS tools and liquor license data.  This variable should indicate 
if liquor by the drink and retail liquor are substitutes, complements, or unrelated with 
respect to availability and consumption.  Additionally, the percentage of those in the 
labor force that commute more than 15 minutes to work was included as a control for 
“spatial substitutability”.  If a large proportion of residents commute a long distance, then 
they are more likely to come in contact with a liquor store that is not the one closest to 
their home.  
Border Effect Dummies:  Stores that are located in North Carolina or Virginia 
in a market area bordering another state have a dummy variable indicating which state 
they border.  Virginia borders Maryland, Washington D.C., West Virginia, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee.  North Carolina borders South Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee.  These 
variables are included to account for any border-crossing that may occur due to price 
differences.  While it is not possible to make categorical statements comparing prices in 
different states due to differences in taxes, competition, and other factors, Maryland, 
                                                 
11 Adherents include full members, their children, and regular attendees of a church, synagogue, or mosque. 
12 For example, only Virginia allows the use of “cents off” coupons.  
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D.C., West Virginia, South Carolina, and Kentucky have generally lower price levels 
than North Carolina and Virginia, while Tennessee and Georgia’s prices are generally 
higher. 
Areas which have large numbers of tourists or business travelers will tend to 
have sales made to these individuals increase the apparent consumption of those living in 
the area.  Census data which measures the percentage of the labor force employed in 
entertainment or recreation fields is used as an indicator of the amount of tourism in an 
area relative to the size of the population.    
The unemployment rate for each group of consumers is calculated from the 
census data.  The number of those unemployed is recorded for each block group.  This 
number is divided by the total number of persons minus those identified as non-labor-
force participants.  This variable may have a positive relationship with alcohol sales for 
two reasons.  First, unemployed people have more leisure time to consume alcohol.  
Additionally, they may be more likely to use alcohol more as a drug.  However, liquor is 
the most expensive delivery method for alcohol use in these states due to tax rates.  
Descriptive statistics appear in Table 3.  A correlation matrix for the independent 
variables is contained in Appendix 1, and shows that the highest correlation between 
explanatory variables is 0.599, so multicollinearity is not likely to be a problem.13 
TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Units St. Dev. 
Per Capita Sales 73.84 Dollars 48.81 
Distance to Closest Store 3.43 Miles 2.02 
Per Capita Income 21,079 Dollars 7,383 
Religion (% South. Baptist) 13.58 Percent 7.88 
Other Religious Adherents 29.38 Percent 7.85 
Mixed Beverage Outlets 6.14 Rate/10,000 pop 8.06 
Over 15 Mile Commute 69.53 % of Labor Force 9.73 
% Unemployment 5.13 Percent 2.87 
% Nonwhite 29.05 Percent 19.61 
% Ent/Rec Empl. 6.64 Percent 2.85 
 
5. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
We begin with the basic log-log OLS equation: 
ln ln lni i i i iQ a T b Y cD ε(5) = + + +
                                                
 
where Qi is the dollar amount of apparent per capita consumption, Ti is a measure of 
access, Yi is a measure of income, and Di are other demographic and explanatory 
variables.  The one variable that is conspicuous in its absence in equation (5) is price.  
Price is not included as a variable because within these two states the price of liquor is 
determined by a formula (see Table 2).  The resulting prices are very similar in the two 
 
13 E.g. Kennedy(1998) suggests that 0.8 or 0.9 in absolute value is a “high value” (p. 187) 
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states, the differences being somewhere on the order of 3%.  For example, the most 
popular seller in Virginia is Jack Daniel’s 7 Black.  For a 750ml bottle, the price is 
$23.50 and in North Carolina the price is $24.50.  However, for a 1.75L bottle, the price 
in NC is slightly lower ($46.95 vs. $47.95).  The Virginia dummy variable will capture 
any effects of these small differences. 
These regressions will be tested for the presence of spatial structure. Because 
these data are explicitly spatially related, omitting this information can cause omitted 
variable bias and/or inefficiency.  There is a potential for spatial spillover effects as 
customers of one area purchase in neighboring market areas.  
5.1 Spatial Econometric Models: Lag vs. Error  
  Because neighboring areas are likely to be related through unobserved spatial 
dependence or spatial heterogeneity, the first task is to define in what manner areas are to 
be considered neighbors.  This can be done in several ways, including areas that share a 
common boundary or areas that are within (say,) 15 miles of one another.  In this paper 
we define areas as neighbors using queen contiguity; that is, areas are considered 
neighbors if they share a common boundary or meet at a corner. Then, a contiguity (i.e. 
spatial weights) matrix is constructed which mathematically represents these neighbor 
relationships.  The two basic classes of spatial models are spatial error and spatial lag 
models. 
A spatial lag model is appropriate when activity in one location both affects, and 
is affected by, activity in neighboring locations, or when there is spatial contagion of a 
disease or a trend over space and through time.  Spatial error models are often employed 
when data on important variables involving the spatial structure of an activity are 
unobserved.  Alternatively, one can interpret these models as incorporating the fact that 
unobserved influences are correlated across space.  In these cases, the error terms in a 
regression will tend to be spatially correlated. Econometrically, the spatial lag model is 
estimated via a “spatial autoregressive model” (Anselin 1988).   
(6)  
Simply stated, this formula tests the hypothesis that per capita consumption (y) is a both a 
function of explanatory variables ( ) as well as a function of the per capita 
consumption of neighboring areas ( ).  Here, ρ is constrained to be less than one, 
and describes the “strength” of the spatial dependence. 
In a similar fashion, the spatial error model assumes a spatial correlation among 
the e o t  rr r erms:
(7) ݕ ൌ ܺߚ ൅ ݑ,     ݑ ൌ ߣܹݑ ൅ ߝ,   ݓ݄݁ݎ݁  ߝ~݅. ݅. ݀. 
The failure to estimate a spatial lag model (when called for) will lead to inconsistent and 
biased estimates.  However, in the case of a spatial error model OLS estimates are 
unbiased, but inefficient.  There are several other flavors of spatial econometric models, 
most notably the spatial Durbin model because it nests the spatial error and lag models as 
special cases.  It takes the form 
εβρ +X+= Wyy
βX
Wyρ
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(8) ݕ ൌ ߩܹݕ ൅ ܺߚ ൅ ܹܺߠ ൅ ߝ 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4. OLS Results 
Variables Coefficient Std. error t p value 
(Intercept) 0.7408 1.0904 0.679 0.497 
log(Av. Dist.) -0.1212 0.0427 -2.84 0.005 
% non-white 0.0019 0.0015 1.26 0.208 
log(PCI) 0.4327 0.1065 4.062 <.001 
% Unemployment -0.0112 0.0099 -1.138 0.256 
% Ent/Rec Empl. 0.0449 0.0078 5.733 <.001 
DC -0.4145 0.1955 -2.12 0.034 
GA 0.3947 0.3315 1.191 0.234 
KY -0.2555 0.1994 -1.281 0.201 
MD -0.0866 0.1473 -0.588 0.557 
SC -0.1531 0.0936 -1.636 0.102 
TN -0.1164 0.1491 -0.781 0.435 
WV -0.1576 0.1205 -1.307 0.192 
VA -0.0797 0.0415 -1.918 0.056 
% Southern Baptist -0.0003 0.0028 -0.118 0.906 
Other Adherents -0.0077 0.0027 -2.844 0.005 
Mixed Bev. Availability 0.0123 0.0088 1.404 0.161 
Long Commuters -0.0110 0.0023 -4.742 <.001 
R2=0.2953     N=650     
If θ=0, then (8) degenerates into the spatial lag model, and if θ= -ρβ, then (8) simplifies 
into the spatial error model (because λ=ρ in this case). 
 A spatial specification search can take one of three paths.  If the spatial structure 
is known a priori, then this should guide the modeling decision.  However, is there is 
uncertainty about the spatial structure, traditionally a “specific-to-general” approach has 
been used.  One starts by running an OLS model, and then one can perform Lagrange 
Multiplier tests  to determine the form of the spatial dependence.  However, LeSage and 
Pace (2009)14 advocate the “general-to-specific” approach, which entails running the 
spatial Durbin model first, and testing for the restrictions mentioned above in order to see 
if either the spatial error or lag models are adequate.  We will demonstrate both 
approaches in the next section. 
5.2 OLS Results and Specification Tests 
The results of OLS estimation are shown in Table 4.15  Using these results as a 
starting point, we calculate Lagrange Multiplier tests for the lag and error models 
described above.16  Because each LM test can result in a false positive for the other type 
                                                 
14 See Elhorst (2010) for an excellent review and discussion of LeSage and Pace’s book. 
15 All data analysis was performed using the R language system (R Development Core Team, 2009) 
including the spdep spatial analysis add-in (Bivand et al., 2010). 
16 See Anselin(1988) and Anselin, Bera, Florax, Yoon (1996) for details about these tests. 
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of model, a robust form of each test is also used.  The LM Tests (Table 5) for both 
models are statistically significant, however, only the Robust LM statistic for the spatial 
lag model is significant.  Thus, the specific-to-general approach points toward the spatial 
lag model as the correct specification, shown in Table 6.  Tests for residual spatial error 
correlation and heteroskedasticity indicate no problems, and so we could be confident in 
these results. 
 
TABLE 5. Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence 
Variables LM Coefficient p value 
LM Error 5.380 0.020 
Robust LM Error 0.556 0.456 
LM Lag 8.672 0.003 
Robust LM Lag 3.848 0.050 
 
TABLE 6. Spatial Lag Model 
Variables Coefficient Std. error z p value 
(Intercept) 0.4052 1.0765 0.376 0.707 
log(Av. Dist.) -0.1214 0.0418 -2.907 0.004 
% non-white 0.0018 0.0015 1.228 0.220 
log(PCI) 0.4002 0.1045 3.829 <.001 
% Unemployment -0.0109 0.0097 -1.133 0.257 
% Ent/Rec Empl. 0.0396 0.0078 5.090 <.001 
DC -0.3895 0.1914 -2.036 0.042 
GA 0.3920 0.3242 1.209 0.227 
KY -0.3051 0.1953 -1.562 0.118 
MD -0.0793 0.1441 -0.550 0.582 
SC -0.1317 0.0917 -1.437 0.151 
TN -0.1007 0.1459 -0.691 0.490 
WV -0.1652 0.1179 -1.401 0.161 
VA -0.0717 0.0408 -1.756 0.079 
% Southern Baptist 0.0004 0.0028 0.156 0.876 
Other Adherents -0.0074 0.0027 -2.752 0.006 
Mixed Bev. Availability 0.0132 0.0086 1.533 0.125 
Long Commuters -0.0107 0.0023 -4.740 <.001 
Rho: 0.15727   LR test value: 7.9139   p-value: 0.0049 
LM test for residual autocorrelation:   test value: 0.8668  p-value: 0.3519 
Spatial Studentized Breusch-Pagan Testa:  BP = 17.0072, df = 17, p-value = 0.4539 
a (Anselin, 1988 and Bivand, 2010) 
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However, Elhorst (2010) suggests that if either LM test is positive, the next step should 
be to estimate the spatial Durbin model.  Then, likelihood ratio (LR) tests can be used to 
test restrictions of the model to determine if the spatial lag or error models are adequate.   
TABLE 7: LR Tests for restricting Durbin to lag and error models (17 df) 
Model log likelihood LR Stat Significance 
Durbin -384.873 
Lag -401.195 32.644 p=0.013 
Error -402.414 35.082 p=0.006 
 
As previously mentioned LeSage and Pace (2009) recommend starting the specification 
search with the spatial Durbin model in any case.  The log likelihood LR tests for 
restricting the model to the spatial lag or error models are shown in Table 7 and estimates 
for the spatial Durbin model are shown in Table 8.  Because these LR tests are highly 
significant, the general-to-specific method clearly indicates that the spatial Durbin model 
is the most appropriate.  Note that in the spatial Durbin  model each coefficient has two 
estimates, one for the direct effect, and one for the indirect (lagged) effect.   
In order to easily discuss marginal effects of coefficients in models such as the 
lag or Durbin models which contain a spatially lagged dependent variable it is necessary 
to use LeSage and Pace’s (2009) suggested method for calculating the average direct and 
indirect (feedback) affects for each of the variables of interest (Table 9).  Unless 
otherwise noted, we discuss the Total Effect of these impacts.  
5.3 Discussion of Results 
The income elasticity of 0.598 is a little higher than estimates found in previous 
studies because of the dual role of the income variable here controlling for quantity as 
well as quality, and confirming that liquor is a normal good.17 The coefficient on the 
percentage of workers in the entertainment and recreation industry is statistically 
significant, positive, and large for both the own and lagged values.  The coefficient 
implies an 8.5% increase in per capita sales for each 1 percentage point increase in the 
labor force employed in entertainment/recreation fields.  The large size on the 
entertainment and recreation variable is understandable, since a change of one percentage 
point in employment in these fields represents a large change in tourism given that the 
median in the data is 5.9%.    
The own border dummy for Washington, D.C. is statistically significant, 
consistent with the fact that they have much lower prices than Virginia.  Per capita sales 
are roughly 42% lower in counties bordering these regions, possibly indicating border-
crossing sales and commuter effects.  The Virginia dummy variable is not significant in 
the Durbin model, indicating no difference between sales in the two states, ceteris 
paribus.  
 
                                                 
17 For example Cook and Tauchen(1982)’s  estimate for income elasticity is 0.43.  
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 TABLE 8. Spatial Durbin Results 
Variables Coefficient Std. error z p value 
(Intercept) -0.9691 2.2593 -0.4289 0.6680 
log(Av. Dist.) -0.1654 0.0427 -3.8709 0.0001 
% non-white 0.0006 0.0016 0.3470 0.7286 
log(PCI) 0.4006 0.1089 3.6796 0.0002 
% Unemployment -0.0079 0.0095 -0.8279 0.4077 
% Ent/Rec Empl. 0.0341 0.0086 3.9662 0.0001 
DC -0.4171 0.1904 -2.1911 0.0284 
GA 0.0388 0.3518 0.1103 0.9121 
KY -0.4913 0.2220 -2.2130 0.0269 
MD 0.0426 0.1445 0.2946 0.7683 
SC -0.0235 0.1371 -0.1713 0.8640 
TN -0.1045 0.1565 -0.6678 0.5042 
WV -0.0566 0.1219 -0.4646 0.6422 
VA -0.0850 0.1893 -0.4487 0.6536 
% Southern Baptist 0.0084 0.0037 2.2749 0.0229 
Other Adherents -0.0099 0.0031 -3.2310 0.0012 
Mixed Bev. Availability 0.0179 0.0090 1.9996 0.0455 
Long Commuters -0.0084 0.0023 -3.6085 0.0003 
lag.log(Av. Dist.) 0.0613 0.0869 0.7053 0.4806 
lag.% non-white 0.0021 0.0032 0.6495 0.5160 
lag.log(PCI) 0.1270 0.2250 0.5642 0.5726 
lag.% Unemployment -0.0036 0.0232 -0.1536 0.8779 
lag.% Ent/Rec Empl. 0.0409 0.0163 2.5121 0.0120 
lag.DC -0.0051 0.4544 -0.0112 0.9911 
lag.GA -0.1590 0.7362 -0.2160 0.8290 
lag.KY 1.2336 0.5401 2.2840 0.0224 
lag.MD 0.3956 0.3620 1.0926 0.2746 
lag.SC -0.2396 0.2140 -1.1195 0.2629 
lag.TN -0.2576 0.3109 -0.8284 0.4074 
lag.WV 0.1912 0.2946 0.6489 0.5164 
lag.VA -0.0510 0.1985 -0.2570 0.7972 
lag.% Southern Baptist -0.0113 0.0055 -2.0599 0.0394 
lag.Other Adherents 0.0067 0.0050 1.3289 0.1839 
lag.Mixed Bev. Avail. -0.0446 0.0187 -2.3863 0.0170 
lag.Long Commuters -0.0030 0.0050 -0.5987 0.5494 
Rho: 0.11715, LR test value: 3.5346, p-value: 0.0601 
LM test for residual autocorrelation test value: 3.421, p-value: 0.0644 
Spatial Studentized Breusch-Pagan Test  BP = 31.4742, df = 34, p-value = 0.592 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interestingly, the percentage of the population that are Southern Baptist is 
positive for the direct effect, but negative for the lagged impact.  The measure for other 
religious affiliation (Adherents) is negative and significant for the direct effect, but the 
lagged value is not statistically significant. 
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TABLE 9. Direct and Indirect Effects of Variables of Interest 
Variable Direct Indirect Total 
log(Av.Dist) -0.165 0.047 -0.118 
log(PCI) 0.404 0.193 0.598 
% Ent/Rec. Empl. 0.035 0.050 0.085 
DC -0.418 -0.060 -0.478 
Baptists 0.008 -0.011 -0.003 
Other Adherents -0.010 0.006 -0.004 
Mixed Beverage 0.017 -0.047 -0.030 
Long Commuters -0.008 -0.004 -0.013 
 
Availability of mixed beverages in restaurants has a positive direct effect, 
indicating complementarities between on- and off-premise purchases of liquor, but the 
negative indirect impact moderates this so that the total effect suggests substitutability.  
The impact of long commuters is negative, as expected. 
5.4 The Interpretation of Access  
As expected, the coefficient on the access measure is negative and significant in 
all three models estimated, and the marginal effects imply a marginal effect of around -
0.12. This can be interpreted as an elasticity: For each 1% increase in distance, per capita 
purchases drop by approximately 0.12%.  Thus, we can see that this relationship is very 
inelastic.  As discussed in the theory in Section 3, this elasticity of -0.12 stands in stark 
contrast to consensus estimates of the price elasticity of demand for liquor -1.5 (NIAAA, 
2001), reinforcing the theoretical differences we outlined. 
As we observe the average travel distance for a store’s market area increase, one 
would (ceteris paribus) expect total sales to increase as more customers are included in 
the market area.  However, one would expect a smaller fraction of these customers to 
connect because of higher travel costs.  Thus, what we have is a measure of an 
“apparent”18 travel cost elasticity of demand. We can write this elasticity as follows: 
(9)   
N
QP
N
tc T ~*
*∂=ε
QP T~* )(∂
N
 
where ~  is the total population in a market area.  Given that P is fixed by the same 
formula at all stores, we can write ( * / ) * ( / )P Q N P Q N∂ = ∂ 
N
, and the price will cancel 
out of the elasticity.  The elasticity now involves only quantity, not dollar value of sales.  
In addition, if we assume that the quantity sold is a linear function of ~ (ceteris paribus), 
then we can also bring out the 1/ N~  from the derivative, and it, too, cancels out.  This 
gives: 
                                                 
18 “Apparent”, because this elasticity does not describe how individuals respond, but rather how the aggregate 
sales respond. 
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(10)         Q
T
T
Q
tc *∂
∂=ε
 
Recall that in Section 3 it was argued that consumers will respond to increases in 
travel costs just as they would to an increase in a fixed fee in a two part tariff.  
Schmalensee (1981) derives some useful relationships describing how consumers will 
behave in such a model.  Let q  be the quantity demanded by a marginal consumer, and 
let subscripts denote partial derivatives.  In a model assuming that income effects are 
zero: 
ˆ
(11)    TTP QNqN == ˆ
Here N reflects the number of consumers who actually connect to the market.  Equation 
(8) states that a price increase of PΔ  has the same disconnection effect as a q
increase in travel costs.  The last equality simply states that the change in the quantity 
sold in the market as transportation costs increase must equal q  .  In this context, T 
must be in dollar units rather than miles.  As a very rough estimate, let us assume that the 
IRS figure of 36 cents per mile in 2003 is a rough approximation of marginal (rather than 
average) travel costs, including the consumer’s time.   
TΔˆ
N*ˆ
T
T
Converting miles into a travel cost in dollar units will not change the point 
estimate of the elasticity, because this will change both the measure of T and the 
magnitude of ∂ by identical amounts.  However, in order to isolate QT from the 
elasticity, we should multiply by the average value of Q/T from the data.  The average Q 
(in bottles) per store was around 83,000 and average travel cost was $2.46 measuring 
distance as the crow flies.  If we inflate this cost by 30% in order to account for actual 
road networks in these two states (Burkey, 2010) this gives a better estimate of $3.20 per 
trip.  This gives a measure of -3,113 for QT, which should also equal NP for the average 
store.  The major problem with the calculation of QT above is that the $3.20 figure is per 
trip, using yearly figures.  Since more than one trip per year is probably taken by those 
who connect, 3,113 is certainly an upper bound on TQ .  In addition, $0.36 per mile is 
probably a fairly low estimate of marginal cost per mile, reinforcing the likelihood that 
|QT| is less than calculated. 
 Even so, approximately –3,000 is not a wholly unreasonable value for QT and NP.  
Suppose that this value would hold for a $1 change in Travel Cost or Price.  Given that 
the average number of potential customers per store is around 15,000, NP would indicate 
that increasing the price of liquor $1 (approximately 10%) would cause 3,000 marginal 
customers to disconnect.  While this does seem drastic, it is not out of line with Cook and 
Tauchen’s (1982) price elasticity estimate of -1.8 and consensus estimates of -1.5.  The 
above price increase would cause a decrease in total quantity demanded of 15-18%, 
which would include a sizeable percentage of consumers (the low demanders) dropping 
out of the market and purchasing a substitute.   
 QT would tell us that the average number of bottles sold per store (83,000) will 
drop by about 3,000 if travel costs are increased by $1.  This number also seems to be 
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within the bounds of reasonability.  If we had data on qˆ , the quantity consumed by a 
marginal consumer per year, we could estimate  ்ܰ ൌ యబబబ೜ෝ  .  Supposing that is 1 or 2 
bottles per year would lead us to conclude that is between 1,500 and 3,000 for an 
average store. 
qˆ
TN
6. CONCLUSION 
While it is still argued by many non-economists that consumers will react to 
increases in travel costs as an increase in price, in this paper we have shown that the 
travel cost elasticity of retail liquor purchases is substantially smaller than consensus 
estimates for the price elasticity of demand for liquor, and is theoretically a very different 
concept. Increases in a fixed fee should have no marginal effect on a consumer’s 
purchases.  Instead, consumers with sufficiently low surplus will disconnect from the 
market entirely, and purchase a substitute.   
With an estimated elasticity of -0.12, consumers are extremely inelastic in their 
response to accessibility to retail liquor, but are elastic with respect to price (εp= -1.5).  
The two states examined in this study are currently considering privatizing liquor sales19, 
but are concerned that privatization would lead to higher numbers of stores, and therefore 
higher consumption.  The preceding analysis suggests that policymakers have a more 
effective tool in restraining consumption by keeping prices high, rather than keeping 
accessibility low.  Thus, privatization could succeed by focusing on taxes to keep prices 
high, and leave the number and location of facilities to the market process.   
                                                 
19 See Robertson (2010) and Hinkle (2010), for example. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Correlation Matrix 
%nonwhite commute %unemp %Ent/Rec Empl. PCI %Baptist %Adherents Mixed Bev. 
%nonwhite 0.004 0.599 -0.036 -0.369 -0.078 -0.202 -0.023 
commute 0.004 -0.316 -0.432 0.186 -0.112 -0.110 -0.287 
%unemp 0.599 -0.316 0.159 -0.538 0.142 -0.016 0.050 
%Ent/Rec Empl. -0.036 -0.432 0.159 0.082 -0.109 0.008 0.538 
PCI -0.369 0.186 -0.538 0.082 -0.344 0.037 0.315 
%Baptist -0.078 -0.112 0.142 -0.109 -0.344 0.591 -0.166 
%Adherents -0.202 -0.110 -0.016 0.008 0.037 0.591 0.029 
Mixed Bev. -0.023 -0.287 0.050 0.538 0.315 -0.166 0.029 
 
